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STEVEN SHAPIN and SIMON SCHAFFER, Leviathan andthe air-pump. Hobbes, Boyle, and
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aeris, by Simon Schaffer, Princeton University Press, 1985, 8vo, pp. xiv, 440, illus., £43.00.
InhisHistoryoftheRoyalSocietyofLondon,published in 1667asanexplanationanddefence
ofmen who spent theirtimeweighing the airand anatomizing beetles, Thomas Sprat threw out
many striking analogies between contemporary politics and the activities he defended. The
Society fitted perfectly with the spirit ofreconciliation and tolerance supposed to characterize
the Restoration: it forbade discussion ofpolitics or religion; it limited dissent to matters about
which agreement could be reached; it stuck to matters offact; it promoted industry, sobriety,
good judgment, and balance; it opposed enthusiasts, dogmatists, radicals, and sinners.
Shapin and Schaffer have dilated and developed Sprat's analogies and metaphors with the
persistence and prolixity of the Society's cynosure, Robert Boyle. Their argument may be
distilled as follows. Boyle wished to set aside a "social space" (the term is theirs) for the
cultivation ofexperimental philosophy; he also wanted to demonstrate to society at large how
civic and religious dissent might be managed peacefully and productively; in fact, he wanted
both, for, asShapinand Schafferclaim, "solutions to theproblemofknowledge are solutions to
the problem of social order" (p. 332). They discern three "technologies" in Boyle's effort to
establishhis"experimental language" (p.49),his"disciplinedcollective social structure" (p. 78),
his "space . . . so securely bounded that dispute could occur safely within [it]" (p. 303), his
"experimental form oflife" (p. 314). The technologies were: the material, that is, experimental
apparatus, of which the air-pump was the exemplar; the literary, or wordy descriptions of
experiments performed, of the witnesses present and their reliability, and of the machines
themselves; and the social, or rules ofengagement in philosophical debate, the pre-eminence of
thematteroffact, and thedown-gradingorexclusionofconjectures ortheories about thecauses
and principles ofcertified phenomena. Withall, the experimental philosopher must be modest,
open and flexible: "Till a man is sure he is infallible", Boyle wrote, "it is not fit for him to be
unalterable."
These "technologies" drew fire from the plentiful furnace ofThomas Hobbes, whom Shapin
and Schaffer use as a detector ofthe aspects ofBoyle's programme offensive to contemporaries
whodiffered fromhimpolitically. Hobbespointed out that thematerial technology leaked; that
theliterarytechnology, atleastinrespectofthetestimonyofwitnesses, hadnoforce("noinfinite
number of grave and learned men" make certainty, "but authority"); and that the social
technology misconstrued the nature ofknowledge. By making the matter offact, and not the
underlying principle, the main object of investigation, one forfeits the chance at truth and
certaintyandhas no reliableway toexclude seriousanddangerous error. Boyleand hisprecious
air-pump would be an ongoing peril as long as experimental philosophers waffled over the
nature ofthe "vacuum". Hobbes knew from principle that a true void space, being immaterial,
could not be; others not so guided, like the noisy Cambridge philosopher Henry More, and the
demonstrator of witches, Joseph Glanvil, admitted the void, and imagined that Boyle's
experiments proved the existence of spaces for angels and spirits to play in.
Hobbes's dogmatism in natural philosophy was of a piece with his concept of the State. In
philosophy, theforceofreason, workingfrom sureprinciples in thestyle ofEuclidean geometry,
must compel assent; "who is so stupid", heasked, "as both to mistake in geometry, and also to
persist in it, when another detects his error to him?" In the State, the King's authority should
prevail over all dissent and dissenters in both civil and religious matters. Just here, loose talk
about vacuums threatened the peace. Forpriests would set up asexperts on the immaterial, and
construct anindependent base ofpower on the strength oftheirpseudo-knowledge, as they had
inthepast; and sobring about subversionsandrebellions. Themethodofcreating andcertifying
knowledge, and the problem ofestablishing social order, forced Boyle and Hobbes to sharply
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different conceptions ofthe relationship between organized religion and natural philosophy, as
well as to conflicting evaluations of the relation between knowledge and fact.
Shapinand Schafferhavedirectedattentiontoacapitalprobleminthehistoriographyofearly
modern science: thecreation ofa sustained practice ofexperimental natural philosophy. Itisnot
a new problem. To go back no further than 1971, Joseph Ben-David then emphasized that the
success of what he indiscriminately called "scientists" in obtaining social acceptance for their
claims to knowledge and thereby a role in society needed explanation; and he dated the first
full-dress staging ofthe role to Restoration England. Shapin and Schaffer havegone farbeyond
Ben-David in the detail oftheir reading ofthe texts and in the intricacy oftheir argument. They
show that Boyle and his group shouldered a burden ofproofwhen they claimed that the matter
offact should bethebasis oftheirscience and theirethics. Itwastheoldquestion ofthehierarchy
ofknowledge: natural philosophy and its practitioners had a place in the schools, and hence in
society; to challenge them-not necessarily to replace them-required mobilization of more
than a few bits of contrived experience interpreted as contradictory to traditional ideas.
In this last connection Shapin and Schaffer's representation ofBoyle's group as assertive and
expansive, asmissionaries ofthemodel method forall social transactions, rings false. Theywrite
(p. 340): "The experimentalists' task was to show others that their problems could be solved if
theycame to the experimental philosopher and to the space he occupied in Restorationculture."
But, as they also emphasize, it was just these problems-social problems-that the Royal
Society excluded from its "space". Their claim that, because Boyle and his followers advocated
application of the results of their investigations to the support of religion, "their laboratories
acquired a sacred status" (p. 319), should also be put down to over-enthusiasm.
Theenthusiasts provide much information ofvalue even to those who may doubt the reach of
their analogy between politics and natural philosophy. Their concept of literary and social
technologies in the practice of experimental science deserves refinement and extension. Their
account of the difficulties Boyle's contemporaries experienced in reproducing his experiments
and even in making air-pumps deserves study by all historians of science. Assent to new
experimental findings requires their replication, or at least a belief in the practicability of
replication; but repetition and confirmation, always problematic to some degree, become
suspect where the technology involved is new orexotic, or when only a singlemachine capable of
producing the new effects exists, or when copies ofthe competent machine can only be made to
work by people who had practised on the original. These problems were not peculiar to the
seventeenth century: the difficulties of replication, the unique machine, and the need for
immediate experience with it to reproduce it, recur in modern particle physics. And finally,
among the parts ofLeviathan and the air-pump ofutility apart from interpretation, is Schaffer's
translation ofHobbes's response to Boyle, the Dialogusphysicus of 1661 and 1668, presented in
English for the first time.
On the debit side, Leviathan has swollen so large that, as is usual with books on British natural
philosophy, it has no room for relevant parallels from Europe. That is a pity. The Society's
policy against conjecturing about causes, which Hooke wished to raise to the status ofa by-law,
also informed the practice of the Florentine Accademia del Cimento; and Boyle's second
technology, the witnessing ofexperiments by trustworthy observers, was common procedure in
Florence, at Athanasius Kircher's "museum" at the Collegio Romano in Rome, in the various
groups that anticipated the Paris Academy ofSciences, and elsewhere. This is not to impugn the
reasons Shapin and Schaffer bring to explain the practices ofthe Royal Society ofLondon, but
to suggest that what was peculiar to the British casecan only be discovered by comparing it with
parallel happenings on the Continent.
Shapin and Schaffer convey their intricate story and lesson clearly apart from a littlejargon
that does not always translate easily. They conduct us through "social spaces"; "disciplinary
spaces"; "physical space"; "abstract space", where "virtual witnesses", i.e. readers of Boyle's
books, "could effectively be mobilized" (p. 336); and, ofcourse through space void ofair. This
spissitudebamboozles evenitscreators. "For Hobbes", they write, "the rejection ofvacuum was
the elimination of a space within which dissension could take place" (p. 109).
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